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Regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics1 
 
Forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly 
 
Ross P Cameron 
University of Leeds 
 
Abstract 
This paper is a discussion of an intuition commonly held by metaphysicians: 
that there must be a fundamental layer of reality; that chains of ontological 
dependence must terminate; that there cannot be turtles all the way down.  I 
discuss application of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, 
composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument.  I 
discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are 
unconvincing.  I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition 
should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the 
justification I think best. 
 
A well-known scientist (some say it was Bertrand Russell) once gave a 
public lecture on astronomy. He described how the Earth orbits around the 
sun and how the sun, in turn, orbits around the centre of a vast collection of 
stars called our galaxy. 
At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and 
said: "What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate 
supported on the back of a giant tortoise." 
The scientist gave a superior smile before replying, "What is the tortoise 
standing on?" 
"You're very clever, young man, very clever," said the old lady. "But it's 
turtles all the way down." 
– From Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time.2 
 
1: Bradley’s regress 
 
We are familiar with Bradley’s regress.3  Suppose a is F.  Suppose, for reductio, that 
it follows that a relation of instantiation holds between a and F – symbolise this as 
RaF.  But now, it seems, R holds between a and F, and there is just as much reason to 
think that a relation of instantiation must bind R, a and F as there was to think that a 
relation of instantiation must bind a and F.  So a relation holds between R, a and F . 
And we’re off on a regress to infin
. . 
ity. 
                                                
 
But what exactly is the problem here?  It depends: does the same instantiation relation 
hold in each case, or is it a different one in each case? 
 
 
1 Thanks to Elizabeth Barnes, Andrew McGonigal, Jonathan Schaffer, and Robbie Williams for helpful 
discussion. 
2 Hawking, (1989, p1) 
3 Bradley (1893) 
Suppose it is the same.  A relation may have infinitely many instances, so what is the 
problem in there being an infinite ‘regress’ of instances of the instantiation relation? 
 
Let me introduce some notation before we proceed.  If a is F let us say that there is an 
instantiation property that applies to the ordered pair <F,a>: that is, there is a property, 
R, such that the ordered pair <x,y> instantiates R if and only if x instantiates y. 
 
The regress, then, is as follows.  If a is F, then the property of instantiation, R, is had 
by the ordered pair <F,a>: R(<F,a>).  So <R,<F,a>> has the property of instantiation, 
i.e. R(<R,<F,a>>), and so <R,<R,<F,a>>> has the property of instantiation.  And so 
on . . .  The regress never looks vicious because we arrive at a different ordered pair at 
each stage.  It seems the problem must be that there are an infinite number of ordered 
pairs that instantiate the instantiation property.  But why is this a problem?  There is 
no general metaphysical bar on properties having infinitely many instances. 
 
Suppose instead that a different instantiation relation is invoked at each stage.  When 
a is F there is a relation that binds together a and F, call it R1.  So there is a relation 
that binds together a, F and R1, call it R2.  So there is a relation that binds a, F, R1 and 
R2 together, call it R3.  And so on . . .  We have an infinite number of instantiation 
relations.  Again, what’s meant to be the problem?  There is no metaphysical bar on 
there being infinitely many entities in general, so why should infinitely many 
instantiation relations create a problem? 
 
Perhaps the problem is meant to be that we shouldn’t have an a priori proof that there 
are infinitely many instantiation relations: it shouldn’t be a consequence of the 
apparently innocuous fact that a is F.  But I won’t dwell on this concern: 
metaphysicians have traditionally been quite content to give us a priori reasons for 
thinking the world to be a certain way, and this seems no worse than any others. 
 
So what is the problem?  What’s wrong with Bradley’s regress?  There have been 
some attempts to extract a logico-linguistic puzzle from Bradley’s regress, but none of 
the results seem very problematic.4  I want, instead, to try to draw out a metaphysical 
problem based on the following thought.  The instantiation relation binding a and F is 
what explains why a is F.  So the obtaining of this relation between particular and 
universal is ontologically prior to the fact that a is F: the state of affairs R(<F,a>) is 
ontologically prior to the state of affairs F(a).  It is in virtue of the obtaining of the 
former fact that the latter fact obtains; a is F because a instantiates F – because the 
instantiation relation binds the universal F-ness to the particular thing a.  But by the 
same reasoning, the obtaining of R(<R,<F,a>>) is ontologically prior to the obtaining 
of R(<F,a>).  The reason why the instantiation relation binds a and F together is that 
the instantiation relation binds the instantiation relation to a’s being F.  And so on . . .  
(Alternatively: the state of affairs of R2 binding together R1, a and F is ontologically 
prior to the state of affairs of R1 binding together a and F, which is ontologically prior 
to the state of affairs of a being F.) 
 
If this reasoning is correct, then Bradley’s regress starts to look more worrying.  It’s 
not just that there are infinitely many instantiation relations, or that the instantiation 
relation applies to infinitely many things.  The worry, rather, is that there are infinitely 
                                                 
4 See Gaskin (1995) for a nice discussion of such problems. 
many levels of facts, the obtaining of each depending on the obtaining of the facts at 
the next level.  The trouble is that it is hard to see how things could get off the ground 
in the first place. 
 
The thought is that while there is no general problem with completed infinities, there 
is a problem if metaphysical explanation never ‘grounds out’ at some fundamental 
level.  While you can have a fundamental level and have infinitely many things 
dependent on that level, you can’t have dependence all the way down. 
 
There are answers to Bradley’s regress, of course.  Armstrong5 denies that any state 
of affairs need be ontologically prior to the state of affairs of a being F.  Sure, a being 
F entails that a instantiates F-ness, which entails that a and F-ness are related in a 
certain way, which entails that a, F and instantiation are related in a certain way, etc.  
But all these truths are necessitated by the one state of affairs: a’s being F.  The single 
state of affairs is the truthmaker for each of the infinitely many truths appearing on 
Bradley’s list, so there is no regress in ontology.  The mistake in the metaphysica
form of Bradley’s regress is to think that the state of affairs of a being F is depende
on a further state of affairs: that of a and F being related by the instantiation relati
There is no state of affairs of a and F being related by the instantiation relation.  There 
is a true proposition <instantiation holds between a and F>; but this is made true 
simply by the state of affairs of a being F. 
l 
nt 
on.  
                                                
 
Perhaps Armstrong’s response to the metaphysical version of Bradley’s regress 
succeeds.  Here, however I’m interested in whether it should have been taken 
seriously in the first place.  Should we uphold its driving intuition – the intuition 
against metaphysical dependency all the way down? 
 
Digression: Some terminology 
 
It will be useful at this point to stop and introduce some terminology.  I will take as 
primitive the relation of ontological dependence.  Ontological dependence is 
transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric.  This relation cannot be analysed, but I think 
we have a good grasp of it: it is the relation that any impure set bears to the 
individuals in its transitive closure – so {a} is ontologically dependent on a, as is 
{{a}}.  The converse of ontological dependence is ontological priority: so a thing is 
ontologically prior to its singleton, and to the singleton of its singleton, etcetera. 
 
The derivative relations of direct ontological priority and its converse direct 
ontological dependence are irreflexive, asymmetric, non-transitive (i.e. neither 
transitive nor intransitive) relations.  x is directly ontologically prior to y iff (i) x is 
ontologically prior to y, and (ii) there is no z such that (a) x is ontologically prior to z, 
and (b) z is ontologically prior to y.  The idea here is that there is something special 
about the relationship between a and {a} as opposed to the relationship between a and 
{{a}}.  a is ontologically prior to both {a} and {{a}}, but it is not directly 
ontologically prior to {{a}}. 
 
I do not assume that if x is directly ontologically prior to y then there is no z≠x such 
that z is directly ontologically prior to y, nor do I assume that there is no v≠y such that 
 
5 Armstrong (1997), p157-158. 
x is directly ontologically prior to v.  I reject the latter assumption because I believe in 
tropes and I think substances are ontologically prior to each of the many tropes that 
inhere in them.  I reject the former assumption because it seems likely that the pair set 
{a,b} is directly ontologically dependent on both a and b. 
 
An entity en has its ultimate ontological basis in the entities e1 to em iff (i) all of e1 to 
em are ontologically independent entities and (ii) there is a chain of ontological 
dependence linking en to one or more of e1 to em.  There is a chain of ontological 
dependence linking en to one or more of e1 to em iff there is a set of entities S1 every 
member of which is ontologically prior to en and either (i) every member of S1 is one 
of e1 to em or (ii) for every member of S1, call it ex, there is a set of entities, Sx, every 
member of which is ontologically prior to ex and either (i) every member of Sx is one 
of e1 to em or (ii) . . . etc. 
 
An entity x is ontologically independent (or fundamental) iff there is no entity y such 
that x ontologically depends on y, ontologically dependent otherwise.  It is false to say 
that an entity x is ontologically independent iff there is no entity y such that x is 
directly ontologically dependent on y; that thought makes appeal to the following 
assumption: that for any dependent entity, there is a finite number of steps taking you 
from it to its ultimate ontological basis.  This should be rejected. 
 
The intuition under discussion does not demand that we should be able to reach the 
ultimate ontological ground in a finite number of steps (which is why we can’t take 
direct ontological dependence as primitive and define the transitive notion of 
ontological dependence in terms of it).  It demands only that there is a fundamental 
ground.  This is compatible with no entity’s depending directly on that fundamental 
ground, but rather every entity’s having a chain of dependence with an infinite 
number of steps taking that entity to the ultimate ground.  Suppose, for example, that 
one held the following three theses: (1) the only ontologically independent 
(mathematically) real number that exists ontologically independently is zero, (2) for 
any two positive real numbers, x and y, x is ontologically prior to y iff x<y, (3) for 
any two negative real numbers, x and y, x is ontologically prior to y iff y<x.  In that 
case, no dependent entity is directly dependent on an independent entity; for every 
dependent entity x, there is an infinite chain of ontological dependence linking x to its 
ultimate ontological basis – zero. 
 
The intuition is just as strong regarding facts as it is regarding objects.  We speak of 
one fact obtaining directly in virtue of another.  This is an irreflexive, asymmetric, 
non-transitive relation, the transitive notion being simply ‘in virtue of’.  The converse 
of these in-virtue-of relations is grounding: F directly grounds G iff G holds directly 
in virtue of F, likewise F grounds G iff G holds in virtue of F, iff the ultimate 
metaphysical grounding of G is in F, iff there is a chain of in-virtue-of relations 
linking G to F.  A fact F is brute iff there is no fact G such that F holds in virtue of G, 
a fact is derivative otherwise.  And the analogue of the grounding intuition is that 
there must be some brute facts to provide the ultimate metaphysical grounding for 
every derivative fact.  I think the claims about objects and facts stand or fall together, 
so I will confine attention to the claim regarding objects and ontological priority. 
 
2: Gunk 
 
The thought behind Bradley’s regress, understood metaphysically, was that 
dependence cannot go on ad infinitum: there must be a fundamental level which 
grounds all the dependent objects or derivative facts.  This thought is quite intuitive.  
Contrast two cases: singletons and atomless gunk.  Socrates exists and is the 
ontological ground of his singleton, because Socrates is directly ontologically prior to 
{Socrates} and is himself an independent entity.  {Socrates} is directly ontologically 
prior to {{Socrates}}; but the ultimate ground of {{Socrates}} is Socrates, not 
{Socrates}.  And so on . . .  This is unproblematic because there is a fundamental 
level, and the existence of things at each non-fundamental level is explained by the 
existence of things at the level below.  Everything which needs explaining is 
explained. 
 
Now consider atomless gunk.  A world is gunky iff it contains no simples: every 
(material) object is a complex object.  Every thing has infinitely many proper parts, 
each of which has infinitely many proper parts, and so on.  Is such a world possible?  
It depends on the nature of the relationship between a complex object and its parts.  If 
neither complex object nor its parts is ontologically prior to the other, perhaps because 
they are identical, then there is no problem.  Likewise, if monism is true, so the 
mereological sum of every material object is fundamental, and the proper parts are 
ontologically dependent on the whole6, then there is no problem. 
 
(These aren’t the only options, of course.  Perhaps ordinary medium sized objects like 
persons, tables, houses, dogs etc are fundamental, and both their proper parts and their 
mereological sums ontologically depend on them.  On this view there is a 
fundamental level and ontologically dependent entities are obtained both by 
composing and by decomposing.) 
 
But if the complex object is ontologically dependent on its parts then gunky worlds 
look problematic.  Again, when you have an infinite sequence of entities e1, e2, e3, . . . 
it doesn’t seem problematic to hold that e2 is dependent on e1, and e3 dependent on e2 
etc, but it does seem problematic if e1 is dependent on e2, and e2 dependent on e3 etc.  
In the composition case, the anti-gunk worry is that composition could never have got 
off the ground.  If the existence of each complex object depends for its existence on 
the existence of the complex objects at the level below, and if we never reach a 
bottom level, then it’s hard to see why there are any complex objects at all. 
 
Jonathan Schaffer is a monist, yet he does not deny that many things exist; instead he 
holds that there is only one fundamental existent (an ontologically independent entity, 
in my terminology): the world.  And this is no contingent truth; for all worlds, w, 
there is exactly one fundamental entity at w: namely, w itself.  One of Schaffer’s 
arguments for this “priority monism” is that the pluralist would find it hard to account 
for the possibility of gunk.  “Nothing is basic [for the pluralist, if the world is 
gunky]”, he writes; “There would be no ultimate ground.  Being would be infinitely 
deferred, never achieved.”  He concludes that “if the many parts are basic, gunk is not 
possible”.7  Here, of course, he relies on an the intuition at hand: that ontological 
dependence can’t go on forever – one must hit the ground eventually. 
 
                                                 
6 See Schaffer (manuscript a), (manuscript b). 
7 Schaffer (manuscript a), Sec 2.4. 
Leibniz gives a similar argument, but rejects the possibility of gunk rather than accept 
the priority of the whole over the parts.  He says 
 
Where there are only beings by aggregation [composite objects], there 
aren’t any real beings.  For every being by aggregation presupposes 
beings endowed with real unity [simples], because every being derives 
its reality only from the reality of those beings of which it is composed, 
so that it will not have any reality at all if each being of which it is 
composed is itself a being by aggregation, a being for which we must 
still seek further grounds for its reality, grounds which can never be 
found in this way, if we must always continue to seek for them.8 
 
Again, then, we see the thought that if everything were dependent, there would be no 
grounding to being: there would be no end to explanation when we try to explain why 
what there is exists. 
 
3: Realism about the mental 
 
Before assessing this intuition against infinite descent in ontological dependence I 
will note another consequence of it: the intuition rules out a global non-eliminativist 
anti-realism about the mental. 
 
Like Devitt9, I take realism to be a conjunctive doctrine: realism about the Φs is the 
view that (i) the Φs exist and (ii) the existence and nature of the Φs is not mind-
dependent.  Anti-realism, then, is a disjunctive doctrine: eliminativist anti-realists 
about the Φs deny that they exist; non-eliminativist anti-realists about the Φs accept 
their existence but hold that their existence or nature depends in some way on what 
we think about the Φs.  But if infinitely descending layers of ontological priority are 
impossible then non-eliminativist anti-realism about the mental must fail. 
 
Devitt’s account of realism has sometimes been thought to face problems when 
applied to the mind.  Realism about the mental would amount to the claim that mental 
entities exist mind-independently; but the mental trivially depends on the mental, so 
anti-realism about the mental is trivially true. 
 
I don’t think Devitt’s account rules out realism about the mental.  The notion of 
independence in the definition of realism should be understood, I think, as essential 
independence as opposed to modal independence.10,11  Assuming for the sake of 
argument that any mind is essentially a mind, it is true, trivially, that minds modally 
depend on mental entities, in that they couldn’t exist in a world without.  But it 
doesn’t follow that minds essentially depend on minds, in that their existence or 
essence is constitutively dependent on mental activity.  Realism denies this essential 
dependence on mental activity, and is not trivially false. 
 
                                                 
8 Leibniz (1686-87, p85), my emphasis. 
9 Devitt (1984) 
10 Jenkins (2005) argues this in detail. 
11 The distinction between essence and modality is familiar from Fine (1994).  An essential connection 
entails a necessary connection, but the presence of a necessary connection does not entail an essential 
connection. 
Once we distinguish essential from modal mind-independence, and realise that 
realism is concerned with the former and not the latter, we can raise a problem for 
non-eliminative anti-realism about mental entities.  If mental entities were mind-
dependent they would be ontologically grounded in episodes of mental activity.  But 
any episode of mental activity is itself a mental entity: namely, a mental event.  So if a 
mental entity, ME, is mind-dependent there must be some distinct mental entity, ME*, 
which is ontologically prior to ME.  (Recall that ontological priority is irreflexive: 
nothing is its own ontological ground.)  Likewise, if ME* is mind-dependent, there 
must be some distinct mental entity that is its ontological ground.  This chain of 
ontological priority can’t go in a circle (since ontological dependence is both 
transitive and asymmetric), so either it goes on forever or else there is at least one 
mental entity that exists mind-independently.  So if the suspicion against an infinitely 
descending sequence of entities, each one ontologically dependent on the entity 
below, is correct, then global mind-dependence with respect to the mental is not an 
option.  Anti-realists about the mental must reject the existence of mental entities 
outright. 
 
4: Arguing for the intuition 
 
Let us take stock.  I have identified an intuition: that when there is an infinite chain of 
entities e1, e2, e3,  . . ., or an infinite chain of facts F1, F2, F3, . . ., then while e2 may 
ontologically depend on e1, and e3 ontologically depend on e2 etc, and while F2 may 
obtain in virtue of F1 and F3 in virtue of F2 etc, it is impossible for e1 to be 
ontologically dependent on e2, and e2 ontologically dependent on e3 etc, or for F1 to 
obtain in virtue of F2 and F2 in virtue of F3 etc.  There must be a metaphysical ground: 
a realm of ontologically independent objects which provide the ultimate ontological 
basis for all the ontologically dependent entities, and a realm of basic facts which 
provide the ultimate metaphysical grounding for all the derivative facts. 
 
If this is correct, it has serious consequences.  It forces us to take Bradley’s regress 
seriously.  It forces us to reject either the possibility of gunk or the claim that a 
complex object is dependent on its parts (in which case a strong case can be made for 
monism).  And it forces us to reject a non-eliminativist anti-realism about the mental. 
 
Leibniz also appears to rely on the principle in his version of the cosmological 
argument.12  The familiar version of the cosmological argument, from Aquinas, says 
that every causal chain must originate in some first cause, and identifies God as the 
first cause.  This isn’t convincing because causal chains need not have a first member: 
even if the universe has only existed for a finite length of time, there could still be an 
infinite number of events in the causal chain, and no first event.  (That is, assuming 
that there is no minimum duration of time it takes for a possible event to occur in.  
And even if this is rejected, why think the universe is only finitely old?)  Leibniz 
replaced ‘cause’ with something like ‘metaphysical ground’.  He was guided by his 
principle of sufficient reason, which is the precursor to today’s truthmaker principle: 
he held that every (contingent) truth must have some metaphysical grounding.  This is 
meant to be an advance on Aquinas because Leibniz thinks it highly intuitive that 
metaphysical grounding, unlike causation, has to bottom out somewhere.  If there is 
no first cause, if every causal chain is infinitely descending, we are not at all tempted 
                                                 
12 See, inter alia, Leibniz (1697), (1714, section 8, p210). 
to say that nothing has a causal explanation; but if there is no ultimate fundamentality, 
there is the strong intuition that nothing has a metaphysical explanation.  (Of course 
any version of the cosmological argument must also meet Russell’s challenge and say 
why God’s existence does not need a grounding outside of God, whilst the universe’s 
existence needs a grounding outside of itself.13) 
 
So what speaks in favour of this far-reaching intuition?  Recall the gunk case.  The 
intuition is that it’s hard to see why there would be any objects at all, given that the 
existence of each depends on the existence of the objects at the level below, and so on 
ad infinitum.  In Schaffer’s charming phrase: “Being would be infinitely deferred, 
never achieved”. 
 
But why is this?  Ontological priority isn’t temporal priority.  It’s not as if God has to 
have made a, b and c previously (literally) if He is to make the sum of a, b and c.  
Why can’t He just make them all together?  Similarly, why can’t He just make all the 
infinitely many things that inhabit the gunky world at once, together with the relations 
of ontological priority that hold between them?  My concern is that the intuition rests 
on us taking too seriously the temporal metaphor suggested by ‘priority’. 
 
(Indeed, even if the ontological priority of a over b required God to create a before b 
it’s not clear that the requisite infinitely descending chains would be impossible.  
Couldn’t God just have performed a supertask, creating e1 at t, e2 (which is directly 
ontologically prior to e1) a minute before t, e3 (which is directly ontologically prior to 
e2) a minute and a half before t, e4 (which is directly ontologically prior to e3) a 
minute and three quarters before t, etc?) 
 
Another possible argument for the intuition rests on the thought that the fundamental 
is what is real, with the dependent being unreal or less real.14  The thought is that if 
there were infinitely descending chains of dependence, of the sort ruled out by the 
intuition, then nothing would be real. 
 
Suppose that the dependent is less real than what it depends upon.  Moving along the 
chain from the fundamental to the dependent takes you from the real to the less real: if 
a is ontologically prior to b then a is more real than b.  If we have an infinite sequence 
of entities closed at one end and open at the other, with an independent entity at the 
closed end, and each subsequent entity dependent on the entity before it in the 
sequence, then we know exactly what to say: the first entity is wholly real, the next a 
little less real, the next even less real, and so on.  Every entity has some degree of 
realness.  But if you have a dependent entity at the closed end, and every subsequent 
entity depending on the entity that comes after it in the sequence, we don’t know what 
to say about any of the entities.  None of them are wholly real, so how can any of 
them have any degree of reality? 
 
                                                 
13 Russell (1999, p79).  Actually, Russell was talking about the causal version, but the same challenge 
arises for the Leibnizian version. 
14 Schaffer may have something like this in mind.  In his (2003, p498) he says that an “ontological 
attitude according to which the entities of the fundamental level are primarily real, while any remaining 
contingent entities are at best derivative, if real at all” is “a natural (though not inevitable) conclusion” 
of the view of reality as “stratified into levels”. 
This is a poor argument for the intuition.  Assume that the dependent is indeed less 
real than that which it depends upon.  Any good reason for holding that if nothing is 
wholly real then nothing can have any degree of reality simply presupposes the truth 
of the intuition in question.  Why couldn’t everything get a bit more real as we 
progress down the chain, without anything being wholly real?  My intuition (insofar 
as I understand what ‘real’ means; I’ll come back to this below) rules this out; but this 
just is the intuition that there must be a fundamental level. 
 
The other form of the argument looks a bit better: if realness doesn’t come in degrees 
and only the fundamental is real then, if everything is dependent, nothing is real.  But 
it is still not convincing.  We need to know what ‘real’ means, and on no plausible 
reading is ‘only the independent is real’ true and ‘nothing is real’ obviously false. 
 
If ‘real’ means ‘fundamental’, then the premise would be a tautology, but to assume 
the falsity of the consequence would clearly be to beg the question.  ‘Real’ might 
mean ‘exists’.  But if ‘real’ means ‘exists’, then I think the non-fundamental is as real 
as the fundamental.  The non-fundamental must exist in order for it to be dependent 
on the fundamental (or the more fundamental).  Non-existent things aren’t dependent 
entities – they’re nothing!  Nor does existence come in degrees, so that would be 
another nail in the coffin of the first form of the argument. 
 
‘Real’ might mean ‘mind-independent’.  But while it may be the case that the things 
that exist at the fundamental level are mind-independent entities, whilst non-
fundamental entities are mind-dependent, it is no part of the concept of ontological 
priority that this be so.  There might be relations of ontological priority holding 
between the mind-independent entities even if nothing were mind-dependent.  
Moreover, ‘nothing is real’ would mean that everything was mind-dependent; but this 
is not obviously false.  At least, it’s not obvious why something must be mind-
independent unless the argument in section 3 of this paper is correct, and we are 
convinced that there are some mental entities; but that argument relied on the intuition 
under question, so its conclusion can’t be appealed to in an argument to establish the 
truth of that intuition.  And if ‘real’ doesn’t mean either existent or mind-independent 
then I don’t know what it means; so I don’t know of a convincing version of the 
above argument for the truth of the intuition. 
 
Another potential justification for the intuition is familiar from the debate between 
Leibniz and Hume.  Here, the thought is that if there could be an infinite chain of 
entities e1, e2, e3,  . . . such that e1 is ontologically dependent on e2, and e2 
ontologically dependent on e3 etc, then, while every entity in the chain is grounded, 
nothing grounds the chain itself.  Even if there needn’t be a first member of the chain 
– an independent entity that provides the ultimate ontological grounding for every 
member of the chain - there must be an ontologically independent entity to ground the 
existence of the chain itself. 
 
But that’s unconvincing.  Grant for the sake of argument that not only must every 
being on the chain have an ontological grounding but the chain itself must have an 
ontological grounding.  This doesn’t entail that anything is an independent entity.  
Perhaps the chain of entities e1, e2, e3,  . . . depends on a further entity ea1 which 
depends on ea2, which depends on ea3 etc?  And if someone asks “but what about the 
chain ea1, ea2, ea3 . . . ?” we can appeal to a new entity eb1 which is the ontological 
ground of this new chain, and which depends on eb2 which depends on eb3 etc.  And so 
on.  In each case, the infinite chain of entities is dependent on an entity which is itself 
the first member of another infinite chain.  Provided we’re prepared to postulate more 
and more entities, one for every cardinal number, then nothing will go ungrounded. 
 
It’s proving hard to argue for the intuition.  Of course, it is an intuition: isn’t that 
reason enough to believe it?  Yes, it is; I certainly feel the force of the intuition 
strongly, and I think that this alone, given that I’ve seen no argument against the 
intuition, is sufficient to give me reason to believe that the intuition is true.  We’ve got 
to rest on intuition at some point, after all; isn’t here as good a place as any?  Why 
should we even be trying to offer an argument for it? 
 
I want to offer an argument because I want to have something to say to an opponent 
who does not share the intuition.  The grounding intuition is not universally accepted, 
and I would like to be able to say more in defence of a principle that is a guiding 
principle of my metaphysic than ‘it just seems true to me’.  I want to offer a 
justification of the principle that my opponents will have to think about – a 
justification that won’t exclude them right off the bat. 
 
That’s what’s proving difficult.  But maybe we’re going about it the wrong way.  We 
certainly shouldn’t expect to be able to give an argument for every metaphysical 
principle from metaphysical principles that are more evidently true, for then we’d 
never stop.  If we’re going to do metaphysics at all, then at some point we’ve got to 
take a metaphysical principle as bedrock, and admit that it is not the conclusion of any 
valid argument the premises of which are on a stronger epistemic footing than the 
conclusion.  Leibniz, for example, never gave an argument for the principle of 
sufficient reason, thus making him a target for the scepticism of Hume; rather, the 
principle of sufficient reason was his starting point.  It seemed evident to him, and it 
became the guiding principle of his system.  I propose that we offer the same status to 
the intuition against infinitely descending chains of dependence.  But this doesn’t 
mean we can’t provide some reason to believe it.  All I’m denying is that the intuition 
can be justified by any more basic metaphysical principle, and so it’s a mistake to 
attempt to justify it in this way.  I suggest instead that we try to justify it by appeal to 
theoretical utility. 
 
If we seek to explain some phenomena then, other things’ being equal, it is better to 
give the same explanation for each phenomenon than to give separate explanations for 
each phenomenon.  A unified explanation for the phenomena is a theoretical benefit.  
That seems to provide some evidence for the intuition under discussion.  For if there 
is an infinitely descending chain of ontological dependence then, while everything 
that needs a metaphysical explanation (a grounding for its existence) has one, there is 
no explanation for everything that needs explaining.  That is, it is true for every 
dependent x that the existence of x is explained by the existence of some prior object 
(or set of prior objects), but there is no collection of objects that explains the existence 
of every dependent x.  This is a theoretical cost; it would be better to be able to give a 
common metaphysical explanation for every dependent entity.  We can do that only if 
every dependent entity has its ultimate ontological basis in some collection of 
independent entities, so this provides us with reason to believe the intuition against 
infinite descent in metaphysical explanation. 
 
This won’t convince someone who thinks this talk of ontological priority is all a lot of 
rubbish; but I’m not trying to do that.  This paper isn’t trying to convince you to 
believe in metaphysical explanation, only that if you believe in metaphysical 
explanation you should believe it bottoms out somewhere.  If you believe in priority, 
you should believe in fundamentality. 
 
5: Ramifications 
 
I have suggested that we abandon the attempt to give a metaphysical argument for the 
intuition under discussion and instead justify it on broadly theoretical grounds.  But if 
this really is the best we can do then there are ramifications: in particular, I think we 
are forced to admit that there is no justification for the claim that the intuition is 
necessarily true.  The status I am according to the intuition is like that enjoyed by 
Ockham’s razor: we should accept it because if it is true the theories we arrive at give 
a better explanation of the phenomena to be explained, and hence are more likely to 
be true.  But such principles of theory-choice don’t appear necessary; it’s not as if the 
world is necessarily such that the simplest explanation is the right one – we just hope 
that our world is.  Relying on these principles could have taken us badly wrong, but 
we live in hope that they don’t in fact do so.  I’ve offered a reason to believe in the 
truth of the intuition against infinitely descending chains of ontological priority, but I 
can think of no reason to believe in its necessity. 
 
So it may be a contingent fact about our world that there are no infinitely descending 
chains of ontological dependence, which means we must be careful when deploying 
the principle.  Consider again the Leibniz/Schaffer argument that if gunk is possible 
then the whole cannot be ontologically dependent on the parts (which led Leibniz to 
deny the possibility of gunk and Schaffer to accept priority monism).  This argument 
relies on the necessity of the intuition under discussion, not simply its truth, and so I 
think it should be rejected.  Sure, if gunk is possible, and if the whole is dependent on 
the parts, then there is a possible world in which dependence never bottoms out in 
fundamentality.  But we’ve got no reason to rule out such worlds – at least, none that I 
can see.  We have reason to think that our world isn’t like that; but that only lets us 
conclude that, as a matter of fact, either the world isn’t gunky or the whole is not 
dependent on the parts.  So there is no pressure to reject either the possibility of gunk 
or the dependence of wholes on parts.  We can hold both; from accepting the 
dependence of wholes on parts there is pressure only to reject the actuality of gunk, 
not its possibility.  (We would be able to resuscitate the Leibniz/Schaffer argument if 
we had the premise that if it’s possible for there to be gunk then there is actually gunk.  
It would follow (at least in the B system of modal logic) from this claim that if it’s 
true that there’s gunk then it’s necessarily true; but I see no reason to think that claims 
like this are true.  The facts concerning when composition and decomposition occurs, 
I have argued elsewhere15, may be contingent.)  This is still an important result, 
however, and may still push us towards priority monism.  For it is epistemically 
possible that the world is actually gunky – physicists might provide us with reason to 
believe this any day – and so we shouldn’t rule out the claim that the world is this 
way.  Since the truth of the claim that the whole is dependent on the parts, together 
with the truth of the intuition against infinite descent in metaphysical explanation, 
                                                 
15 Cameron (forthcoming) 
rule out the truth of the world being gunky, this may push us towards accepting the 
truth of priority monism (if not its necessity, which is what Schaffer argues for16). 
 
Other consequences for the contingency of the principle are: (1) even if the Leibnizian 
cosmological argument works in establishing the existence of God as the grounding 
for all being, it does nothing to establish that God’s existence is necessary, and (2) 
while we have an argument that not everything is a mind-dependent entity, we have 
no reason to rule out the possibility of a world where everything is mind-dependent. 
 
6: Conclusion 
 
We’ve seen some important consequences of the intuition that there cannot be an 
infinite series of entities e1, e2, e3,  . . . such that e1 is ontologically dependent on e2, 
and e2 ontologically dependent on e3 etc.  I looked at some arguments for that 
intuition and found them wanting.  I concluded that the best reason to believe it is that 
theories that don’t violate it are theoretically beneficial.  This justification leaves it 
open that the intuition is a merely contingent truth, in which case we should be more 
careful about how we apply it.  I’ll end on the following moral: we metaphysicians 
must be more attentive to the reasons for believing in the metaphysical claims we rely 
on; we may only have reason to accept the truth of such principles, not their necessity, 
in which case we must be careful to rely on such principles only to tell us about how 
the world is, not how it must have been. 
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